Most human reliability analysis methods have been developed for nuclear power plant applications; this challenges the application of the available techniques to other domains. Indeed, for application to a specific domain, a human reliability analysis method should address the relevant tasks and performance conditions. The aim of this article is to propose a methodology to develop a generic task type-performance-influencing factor structure, specific for application to a domain of interest and directly linked to an underlying cognitive framework of literature. The structure provides the foundation of a human reliability analysis method built on the generic task type concept; it identifies the sector-specific performance-influencing factor effects on the failure probability that the method needs to represent and quantify for each generic task type. The methodology is intended to support a systematic and traceable process to develop the generic task type-performance-influencing factor structure, to ease the review of the process and of its results and, in case, identify and implement changes to the structure. The proposed methodology is applied to the radiotherapy domain allowing the development of sector-specific taxonomies of representative critical tasks, their failure modes, underlying cognitive failure mechanism, and influencing performance-influencing factors. This is part of a broader activity carried out by the Risk and Human Reliability Group at the Paul Scherrer Institute of Switzerland to develop a human reliability analysis method, specific for the radiotherapy domain. The activity is conducted in close cooperation with Paul Scherrer Institute's Center for Proton Therapy, where a first application of the method is foreseen.
Introduction
Most of the human reliability analysis (HRA) methods have been developed for the nuclear industry, driven by the need to include the human component into the plant probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The results of HRA, and in general of PSA, are widely used to inform safety-related decisions, operational and regulatory. Typically, HRA may point to improvements in the plant procedures, in the human-machine interface (HMI), or in the level of automation of certain activities. [1] [2] [3] The quantitative perspective, related to the calculation of a risk figure of merit and of its contributors, is needed to prioritize which improvements are the most effective in reducing risk.
Outside the nuclear power domain, in industries for which PSA practice is established (typically, aerospace and oil and gas), the treatment of the human component has been generally simplified, often introducing bounding error probability values (e.g. 0.01 or 0.001), without performing the detailed analyses underlying the typical HRA. [4] [5] [6] This practice strongly limits the use of PSA to inform safety-enhancing decisions. Some efforts toward extending detailed HRA applications beyond nuclear power plants have been undertaken by the space industry: in their 2011 revision of the PSA guide, the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration has included guidance for application of four HRA methods for space mission analysis. 7 Also, a very recent initiative is ongoing to develop an HRA method specific for application to the oil and gas industry, based on an adaptation of the nuclear-specific Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) method. 8, 9 One HRA method that has been successfully tailored to various domains is the Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART). 10, 11 The most cited strengths of HEART are its easiness to use, its resource effectiveness compared to other HRA methods, and the empirical support from a number of validation studies. 12, 13 HEART is intended to be applicable to different industrial sectors, and therefore, it builds on broad definitions of the types of tasks and influencing factors it addresses. The motivation for developing sector-specific versions of this method has been to provide a set of tasks, influencing factors, and error probability values that would be more representative of the specific domain; this is expected to improve the acceptability, representativeness, and consistency of applications across domains. These sector-specific methods are the Nuclear Action Reliability Analysis (NARA), the Railway Action Reliability Analysis (RARA), and the Controller Action Reliability Analysis (CARA; for the air traffic control domain). [14] [15] [16] These adaptations demonstrate the flexibility of the HEART framework. Indeed, each domain may be characterized by different sets of safety-relevant personnel tasks, influencing factors, and applicable human failure probabilities. However, the analysis framework made of generic task types (GTTs) and error-producing conditions (EPCs) can be applied to several domains, provided that representative taxonomies of task types and conditions are developed, and appropriate relationships to the failure probabilities are established. This paper presents a methodology to develop the GTTPerformance Influencing Factor (PIF) structure, directly linked to an underlying cognitive framework of literature. 17 Note that, the structure presented in this paper will refer to PIFs, intended as the generic factors influencing performance (e.g. ''adequacy of training'', ''task complexity''), and not to specific EPCs, as in the original HEART framework. This allows direct link with the cognitive framework underlying the developed structure (see sections ''Main elements of the HRA method under development'' and ''Methodology for the development of the GTT-PIF structure''). The characterization of the PIFs in terms of specific conditions (error-producing, or, more generally, performanceinfluencing) will be addressed in a separate work (see section "Main elements of the HRA method under development). The GTT-PIF structure indicates which PIFs are the most relevant for each GTT and through which failure modes and mechanisms. Once this structure has been developed, the next step will be to determine the quantitative relationships linking GTTs and PIFs to human failure probability values (the main concepts underlying the method under development will be presented in section ''Main elements of the HRA method under development''). The aim of the methodology is to support a systematic and traceable process to develop the GTT-PIF structure. These properties are needed to ease the review of the process and of its results and, in case, identify and implement changes to the structure. Indeed, the need for developing guidance to support the creation and definition (and, finally, usage) of the PIFs has been recently recognized. [18] [19] [20] The direct link to the cognitive framework is intended to allow for comprehensiveness of the developed taxonomies as well as to make sure that the important links among these taxonomies are captured in the GTT-PIF structure. The need to strengthen the link between HRA and cognitive models has also recently been raised. 17, [20] [21] [22] In this article, a GTT-PIF structure suitable to the external beam radiotherapy domain is developed. This is part of a broader activity carried out by the Risk and Human Reliability Group at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) of Switzerland to develop an HRA method, specific for the radiotherapy domain. The activity is conducted in close cooperation with PSI's Center for Proton Therapy (CPT), where a first application of the method is foreseen.
In radiotherapy, assuring the safety of patients is a key concern. 23 Activities are continuously running at the international, national, and clinic levels to identify root causes from past incidents, near misses, and accidents. International incident reporting systems are promoted, for example, SAFRON and ROSIS (the web links are provided in the references). 24, 25 The vulnerabilities identified from past events have been addressed with guidelines and recommendations for assuring patient safety and reducing risk at the facility (clinic) level, which implement these in the form of safety and quality assurance, control, and management measures. [26] [27] [28] [29] However, the disproportionate focus of these measures/guidelines on equipment is a concern as analyses of adverse events consistently indicate human errors as dominant contributors to clinical incidents. [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] These references stress the need to assess risk and evaluate the effectiveness of the procedures, prospectively and at individual clinics.
For prospective risk analyses, the American Association of Physicists in Medicine (AAPM) recommends failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), and its Task Group 100 developed a consensus-based guidance for integrating risk analysis techniques (FMEA and fault trees) within the quality management programs of radiotherapy clinics. 38 Probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) is also recommended, emphasizing its quantitative focus, its systems perspective, and its orientation to scenarios combining the interactions of equipment, personnel, and safety systems and measures. 23, 34, 39 These techniques are widely used in various industries, including radiotherapy, to support a comprehensive and systematic analysis of hazards and safety barriers and for radiotherapy have produced useful results. 23, [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] A recognized limitation to the development of PSA for radiotherapy is the lack of HRA methods directly applicable to this domain, that is, addressing the relevant types of personnel tasks and influencing factors. 23, 39, [45] [46] [47] [48] A conscious use of screening can allow practical results; however, the development of a method to support a detailed HRA would allow better characterization of the risk and of its main contributors and the identification and evaluation of specific improvements to the process. 23, 49 This article is structured as follows: ''Main elements of the HRA method under development'' section introduces the main elements of the HRA method under development i.e. the method's building blocks, its technical basis and the underlying cognitive framework of reference. The next section, ''Methodology for the development of GTT-PIF structure'', presents the methodology to develop the GTT-PIF structure including the data sources used in the methodology. ''Development of the GTT-PIF structure: application of the methodology to radiotherapy'' section presents the results obtained by the application of the proposed methodology to radiotherapy, which includes: six GTTs connected to 18 GTT-PIF structures linking possible functional failures, failure mechanisms and PIFs. The next section, ''Validation of the GTT-PIF structure against Huq et al. 38 '', presents the validation of the developed GTT-PIF frameworks. This is done by mapping the generic FMEA developed in Huq et al. 38 : the process tasks, failure modes and potential causes identified in Huq et al. to the GTT-PIF structure to evaluate whether the structure covers the sector-specific important tasks and influencing factors. Finally, ''Conclusion'' section gives concluding remarks and future work.
Main elements of the HRA method under development
As said in section ''Introduction,'' the methodology proposed by this article to develop the GTT-PIF structure is intended to form the basis of an HRA method for application to the radiotherapy domain. This section presents the concept underlying the HRA method, to clarify the relationship of the GTT-PIF structure to the overall analysis and quantification approach.
The HRA method under development is intended to guide the analysis and the quantification of human failures. It is planned to include all personnel tasks in the patient-handling process, from when the patient is admitted for treatment until he or she leaves the facility. The involved personnel are radiation oncologists, radiation therapist, medical physicists, dosimetrists, and medical assistants. Human failures may indeed contribute to initiating events and to additional failures along the accident evolution. In general, for accidents to occur, quality checks should also fail; the scope of the method will cover these accident contributors as well. Two treatment phases are out of the method scope: the doctors' decision to treat with the associated dose prescription and the posttreatment follow-up. This is in line with assumptions in other PSA studies for radiotherapy facilities. 41, 44 The development emphasizes the personnel tasks directly involved in the treatment process. In particular, machine calibration and commissioning tasks have been left out of the scope; these tasks are expected to have characteristics similar to other industrial domains, so that the applicability of available techniques (e.g. NARA and CARA as HEART-based examples) appears less problematic.
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GTTs and PIFs
The building blocks of the method are GTTs and PIFs. The concept behind the GTTs is taken from the HEART method, and it is intended to guide the analyst to address the factors that may have specific influence for the particular GTT. 10, 11 A GTT is a representative critical task (within a domain) such that the enveloped tasks are characterized by similarities in the interactions with the system, in the cognitive requirements (e.g. decision making vs execution), and in the potentially influencing factors. In particular, influencing factors would have the same quantitative influence on the failure probability for all tasks enveloped by the GTT. These requirements have been achieved by explicitly building the GTT-PIF structure based on an underlying cognitive model, as it will be presented in sections ''Methodology for the development of the GTT-PIF structure'' and ''Development of the GTT-PIF structure: application of the methodology to radiotherapy.'' GTTs shall be defined such as to be mutually exclusive: given a task to be analyzed, the applicable GTT shall be as clear as possible, without ambiguity among different GTTs.
As typical in HRA, PIFs are used to provide the analyst with a structured framework for assessing what may influence personnel performance during a particular task. The concept is to support their assessment with anchor questions, which guide the analyst to consider the possible existence of conditions that would negatively impact the personnel performance (i.e. EPCs)-this concept is presented in Pandya et al. 50 The approach envisioned is to use the GTT-PIF structure for developing a decision tree quantification framework (Figure 1 ). In this framework, the heading of the decision trees would represent influencing PIFs, with branching rules based on the developed set of anchor questions; each decision tree pathway is then mapped to failure probabilities (the root path of the tree identifies the base failure probability of the GTT failure mode and the rest are failure probabilities with the effect of respective PIFs, see Figure 1 ). To quantify the failure probabilities, the use of data from existing HRA methods will first be explored, for example, from A Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP 51 ) and HEART, with its sector-specific variants. Indeed, although HRA methods have been developed for generally different types of tasks and operating contexts, it may very well be that some specific data are relevant for the radiotherapy domain as well (e.g. generic data on reading errors from display may be expected to be industry independent). The CORE-DATA database, which includes probability data on human failures in safetyrelated tasks in diverse industries, will also be analyzed. 52 In addition to the input from existing methods and databases, sessions of expert elicitation at PSI's Center for Proton Therapy are planned. Nevertheless, it is expected that the data from existing methods and from CORE-DATA will not allow the quantification of all decision tree structures. Ranges of likelihood and factor influence importance will be elicited for specific tree branches to complement the information from the existing sources. The design of the expert elicitation sessions is ongoing.
It is worth noting that the level of decomposition of the GTTs is chosen so as to match the key tasks identified as critical through past incident analyses and literature studies, for example, checking, software interactions, and communication failures. At this rather low level of decomposition, it may also be feasible to use human performance data (from similar tasks in other industries) as well as to collect sector-specific data. Other approaches are possible, for example, analyzing tasks at a more holistic level following the A Technique for Human Event Analysis (ATHEANA) method. 1 The ATHEANA approach demonstrated strong potential to produce rich qualitative insights; 20, 53 in ATHEANA, at present, however, quantification of failure probability is not linked to data but based on expert judgment. For the present work, the more classical HRA framework based on GTTs and PIFs was preferred over the ATHEANA approach also in view of its easiness to use: this may indeed foster its application in a novel domain such as radiotherapy and health care in general. Indeed, rich qualitative analysis (possibly following the ATHEANA scheme) shall always accompany any HRA application to produce qualitative insights on performance; this can always be combined with a lower level quantification scheme such as the one under investigation in the present work. This aspect will be further addressed in the future case study application.
The underlying cognitive framework
A novelty of the method under development compared to HEART and its variants is its explicit foundation on a cognitive framework, in particular the one presented in Whaley et al. 17 It is worth noting that the need to provide a more direct link between HRA models and cognitive sciences has been raised recently for HRA in general, touching all HRA methods. 17 The cognitive foundation aims at better identifying and characterizing the performance influences: eventually, the goal would be to reduce the uncertainty and variability of HRA results. The need for this improvement gained new momentum following the International and US HRA Empirical Studies, which highlighted that at least part of the variability of HRA results can be attributed to a limited underlying theoretical basis. 20, 53 The cognitive framework developed by Whaley et al. includes two parts: the cognitive model, consisting of five macrocognitive functions ( Figure 2 ) and the formulation of cognitive maps linking the function failure mechanisms to PIFs (Figure 3) . 17 The five functions are ''Detecting and noticing,'' ''Sense-making and understanding,'' ''Decision making,'' ''Action,'' and ''Team coordination.'' As Figure 2 shows, there are no arrows connecting each macrocognitive function, to emphasize that the cognitive flow is complex, dynamic, and multidirectional. The identification of these functions draws on existing cognitive models of literature.
54-59 Whaley et al. 17 highlight the general consensus across the models on the main functions, with some differences on the function boundaries; their aggregation; and, most prominently, the representation of how they interact. Whaley et al. 17 recognize that for their purpose, it suffices to consider that these functions work largely independently (so that their failure modes can be considered independent), although the cognitive process is strongly parallel and cyclical. The second part of the cognitive framework consists of maps of macrocognitive function failures linking to PIFs. Figure 3 shows the concept of the mapping; the failure of each macrocognitive function is first linked to the set of possible causes of failure (termed ''Proximate Causes'') and then each ''Proximate Cause'' is linked to the respective ''Failure Mechanism,'' the means by which a function may fail. Whaley et al. 17 The failure mechanisms point to the specific cognitive failures that result in the function failure, for example, failure in attention and working memory, presence of conflicting priorities, and cognitive biases. Finally, as typical for HRA, PIFs are the contextual factors that may influence human performance. Each failure mechanism is linked to the PIFs deemed to influence the likelihood of the failure (Figure 3 ).
The framework in Whaley et al. 17 is intended to provide the foundation for an HRA method for the nuclear power plant domain: an important issue is its applicability to the radiotherapy domain. Indeed, after the review of the Whaley et al.'s sets of cognitive functions, proximate causes, and failure mechanisms, it can be said to have general applicability to human performance in any complex, dynamic domain. Indeed, the psychological, cognitive, human factors and operational research literature reviewed in Whaley et al. to develop their model are not limited to nuclear power applications. Of course, the nuclear power plant application is evident in the specific characterizations of the macrocognitive functions, proximate causes, failure mechanisms, and PIFs. For example, function ''Detecting and noticing'' generally applies to the process of sensing and perceiving important information in the work environment. In nuclear power plant applications, this predominantly translates in sensing and perceiving control room indications of abnormal plant statues. For radiotherapy applications, basically it applies to not only sensing and perceiving information relevant for patient treatment, for example, the tumor spread on computed tomography (CT) scans, but also identifying the patient identity and relevant treatment files. As another example, in the characterization of function ''Team coordination,'' Whaley et al. 17 emphasize the leadership and supervision roles required to coordinate the operating crew response to a situation of possible emergency (as shown by the choice of the corresponding proximate cause). Indeed, in the radiotherapy domain, teamwork manifests in a very different way: patient treatment planning and delivery are distributed across various phases and so are most of the personnel interactions. Leadership and supervision also play important role, especially in the coordination of the activity in each phase and in the performance of the several quality checks.
Anticipating more details in sections ''Methodology for the development of the GTT-PIF structure'' and ''Development of the GTT-PIF structure: application of the methodology to radiotherapy,'' the present work applies Whaley et al.'s cognitive framework to identify the set of PIFs influencing each failure mode characterizing each GTT: the concept is that the GTT-PIF structures should support the identification of GTTs influenced by the same set of factors, with the same impact on the task failure probability. The elements of the cognitive framework (the sets of cognitive functions, proximate causes, failure mechanisms, and PIFs) are applied considering the different characterizations that these elements assume in the radiotherapy context. Also, Whaley et al.'s structures linking macrocognitive function failures to PIFs (depicted in Figure 3 ) are adapted for the specific radiotherapy application: the set of failure mechanisms influencing each proximate cause and the set of PIFs influencing each failure mechanism reflect application-specific influences. Some examples will be presented in section ''Development of the GTT-PIF structure: application of the methodology to radiotherapy. ' along with those traditionally at the basis of the early HRA methods, for example, Rasmussen et al. 60 and Reason. 61 The cognitive framework from Whaley et al. 17 has been used as the basis to develop the GTT-PIF structures, because it systematically links cognitive failure to PIFs via failure mechanisms: as presented in details in the next sections ''Methodology for the development of the GTT-PIF structure'' and ''Development of the GTT-PIF structure: application of the methodology to radiotherapy,'' these structures are the basis for the GTT identification subject of the present work. Another option could be to adopt the cognitive framework underlying the Cognitive Reliability And Error Analysis Method (CREAM), 62 which also links cognitive functions to influencing factors (in the form of CREAM's common performance conditions). The implications of using this different framework could be explored in future work.
Methodology for the development of the GTT-PIF structure
The proposed methodology comprises of four steps. The first two steps aim at the identification of a comprehensive set of instances of tasks (so-called Example Tasks) to be performed by the personnel, characteristic of the radiotherapy process. This defines the set of tasks to be covered by the GTTs; in the next steps, these tasks are grouped to form the GTTs, based on the type of task, interaction with the system, and the set of influencing PIFs. Specific tasks are first introduced in step 1 of the methodology, typically at a higher level of task definition. Example Tasks are then defined in step 2, including all information relevant to identify the cognitive functions predominantly characterizing each task. The third step applies the cognitive framework of Whaley et al. 17 to identify, for each Example Task, the relevant failure modes, mechanisms, and influencing PIFs. In step 4, the Example Tasks are grouped, to define the GTTs. The final result is the set of GTTs, the influencing PIFs, and the corresponding structure which connects GTTs and PIFs through failure modes, causes, and mechanisms. The overall steps of the proposed methodology are shown in Figure 4 .
The overall goal of this step is to obtain a collection of the personnel tasks that, if failed, may have safetyrelevant implications. The term ''specific'' underscores the relevance of the tasks for the radiotherapy domain.
The main inputs for the identification of the specific tasks are hierarchical task analyses (HTAs) and analyses of past incidents. As typical for this type of analysis, HTA breaks the radiotherapy process down into its constituent personnel tasks, providing a first list of specific tasks. The list is further refined with the analyses of past incident databases and literature: it is important to make sure that the failed tasks contributing to actual incidents are included in the list. 24, 25, 32, 37, [63] [64] [65] Indeed, this combination allows for completeness and relevance of the GTT definitions. Completeness should come from the HTAs, which address the whole therapy process. The combination with past incident analyses makes sure that the GTT definitions cover failures that actually resulted in undesired events.
Another important comment concerns the use of past incident information. Depending on the level of detail of the incident description, it may not always be possible to identify the specific failed task, at the level of decomposition matching that of the specific tasks from the HTA. In this case, it is possible to make assumptions on which tasks failed and, eventually, add these tasks to the specific tasks list. This is possible because the goal of this step is to obtain the specific tasks list, not to perform an incident investigation. The failed tasks should be covered in the list, whether these are actual failures or assumed in lack of precise information.
The result of this step is a list of specific tasks related to the radiotherapy patient-handling process. In the next steps of the methodology, these tasks will be further specified and grouped to define the GTTs.
Step 2: derive Example Tasks
In this step, Example Tasks are derived by further detailing the specific tasks. In particular, the information included in the specific tasks obtained from the HTA generally relates to ''what'' is performed, not necessarily to the level of detail required to determine the cognitive function involved (which is required to define GTTs consistently, see step 3 of the proposed methodology). For example, a task such as ''inputting patient ID'' (as it would result from the HTA) could be done from ''memory, reading from a document/screen, or while someone is dictating'' and so on. In this step, the information on ''how'' tasks are performed is collected so as to identify the cognitive functions active during the tasks. Along with the set of specific tasks, this step requires information from the field observations of the treatment process and, possibly, further interviews with the facility personnel.
The second part of this step is to identify for each Example Task the cognitive functions that would be deemed active when the task is performed. Indeed, in general, all macrocognitive functions would be active in a task, but only few would be necessary to characterize the cognitive failure of a task. These dominant cognitive functions are adjudged based on three criteria: the function that would stay active for most of the time; the one that addresses the most challenging parts of the task; and the one that, if failed, would lead to the most severe consequences. Concerning the latter criterion, the severity of the consequences is judged based on the actual result of the failure as well as on the ease to detect the failure. Any function that satisfies at least one criterion would be considered as one of the dominant functions. The dominant cognitive function informs the typical cognitive failure that can be expected when the task fails.
Step 3: determining influencing factor set for each Example Tasks
The tasks covered by each GTT should be characterized by the same set of influencing factors, with the same quantitative influence. To achieve this, step 3 identifies the factors influencing the performance in each Example Task. This will provide the basis for grouping the Example Tasks into GTTs (in step 4). The process to map each Example Task to the corresponding set of PIFs is shown in Figure 5 . The mapping follows the cognitive framework presented in Whaley et al. 17 For each cognitive function involved in the Example Task, failure modes are identified. Each failure mode is then associated to one or more proximate causes that are applicable from the list in Whaley et al.; 17 then, failure mechanisms for each proximate cause are identified, and finally, the PIFs that are deemed to be affecting the failure mechanism are selected. In some cases, the sets of PIFs affecting each failure mechanism were adapted to reflect differences in the application domain. Examples of these will be presented in section ''Development of the GTT-PIF structure: application of the methodology to radiotherapy.'' The final result of this step is a map of Example Tasks and the set of PIFs affecting it.
Step 4: formation of GTTs
The overall goals of this step are to form the set of GTTs, each associated with the corresponding set of Example Tasks and to develop the GTT definitions.
The inputs to this step are the Example Tasks obtained with their respective associated cognitive functions and set of influencing factors. The step is performed in two stages. First, the Example Tasks are grouped based on similarities in the system interaction and task characteristics into an initial set of GTTs. This grouping is based on the specific activity performed by the personnel, as suggested by the Example Task description: for instance, Example Tasks involving planning, identification of items, and running software calculations would be grouped into different GTTs. The key criterion for the grouping is that the Example Tasks belonging to the same group would be characterized by very similar cognitive functions and PIF profiles. Based on this, the initial grouping outlines the definition of the GTT by transforming the task description and system interactions into its definition. Then, the groupings are further refined (including the definition) by homogenizing the associated cognitive functions and the set of influencing factors within each group; that is, certain Example Tasks are moved to other groups, where they would be more applicable: each GTT would then comprise Example Tasks featuring task characteristics, similar system interaction, set of influencing factors, and dominant cognitive function.
The result of this step is the final list of GTTs with their definitions and their respective set of influencing factors. In addition, GTTs are backed with the associated dominant cognitive functions, set of failure modes and of Example Tasks.
Development of the GTT-PIF structure: application of the methodology to radiotherapy
Step 1: identify specific tasks
The documents used for the development of the HTAs were the center's work flow analyses and the standard operating procedures. Several sessions of talk-throughs and walk-throughs were conducted, covering the whole patient-handling process: this was to make sure that the HTAs reflect the actual practice at the center.
In total, 11 HTAs were performed, covering the process phases to be addressed by the HRA method. As an example, Figure 6 addresses the ''Moulaging and Computed Tomography Scan'' step. Moulaging is the process of designing a device such as a mold or mask to keep the patient in the same position during each treatment session such that the desired location is treated every time. Moulage is divided into six main tasks, namely, ''Anaesthesia check, Immobilization and positioning Checks, Marking of fixation devices or skin tattoos, putting ID on fixation device, and Taking photos of the devices.'' These main tasks were further divided into specific tasks, for example, ''immobilization and positioning'' was further broken into ''moulage preparation, fix and adjust the moulage and adjust the fixation devices.''
The level of task decomposition in the HTA was based on the rule presented in Kirwan.
12 Each task was decomposed until the breakdown provides no new useful information about the risk or the failure. For example, task ''Fix and adjust the moulage'' in Figure 6 could be further broken down into ''shift or rotate the moulage'' and ''press or hold the moulage'' subtasks. However, the failure of interest for this application is that the moulage does not immobilize the patient in the desired position: failure of either subtask would lead to such failure so that further decomposition was deemed unnecessary. The list of specific tasks from the HTAs is given in Appendix 1.
The list was then further populated by analyzing past incidents from databases and literature. 24, 25, 32, 37, [64] [65] [66] From the listed failures, the associated failed tasks were eventually added to the list of specific tasks. The perspective with which the past incidents are reviewed was to gather information on which tasks did, or may have, failed in the incidents. Indeed, in some cases, the incident description was not detailed enough to identify which task had failed. In such cases also, assumed possible manifestations of failures were considered and included into the list of specific task types. The typical case is of failures in administrative checks. These are often not explicitly reported in incident descriptions; however, if in the accident review it was deemed that the course of the accident would have foreseen failed checks, then the corresponding tasks related to performing the specific checks were added to the list.
As mentioned in section ''Methodology for the development of the GTT-PIF structure,'' the derivation of the Example Tasks requires information on the cognitive function characterizing these tasks. For some specific tasks, the level of detail of the HTA was not sufficient to determine the cognitive function. The needed information was acquired via observations and interviews with the plant personnel. This was generally needed for tasks that may be performed in different ways depending on the situation: typically tasks related to handling data, handling files and tools, and quality checks. Examples of these ''what + how'' combinations are reported at the top of Figure 7 : these combine what needs to be done (e.g. ''Inputting of patient data into patient positioning and verification software''), with how it is performed (e.g. ''looking and copying from Therapy Planning System (TPS).''
Certain ''what + how'' combinations were grouped into a (more generic) single-form Example Task. As an example, tasks like ''inputting the patient ID into Patient Positioning and Verification software reading from patient Therapy Planning System (TPS)'' and ''inputting the patient ID into patient chart while reading it from a document on the computer'' are grouped into the single Example Task ''Looking and copying/ Inputting Data,'' bottom of Figure 7 . As another example, tasks like ''Detailed quality checks of data within High Resolution CT and CT'' and ''Detailed Quality assurance of plan'' are grouped into a single Example Task ''Detailed check of data within documents.'' In other words, the Example Tasks define the activity performed by the personnel both in terms of interaction with the system/environment (e.g. inputting data and comparing two values) and detailing the key mental activity (e.g. looking and copying, understanding, and noticing an error).
Each Example Task is then associated with the dominant cognitive function, adopting the cognitive model presented in Whaley et al. 17 and based on the criteria mentioned in section ''Methodology for the development of the GTT-PIF structure'' (description of step 2). As shown in Table 1 , for some Example Tasks, more than one dominant function has been identified: this is because it was judged that the task is characterized by important aspects of multiple functions (as discussed in section ''Methodology for the development of the GTT-PIF structure,'' any macrocognitive function verifying at least one criterion would be considered as part of the dominant ones).
As example application of these criteria, consider the set of Example Tasks (from the HTAs ''Volumes of interest'' and ''Treatment planning''), reported in Table 1 . Task 1 is related to identification of the file from a set of files and would require to detect the desired ID number while reading it. This task is straightforward: the dominant cognitive function is ''Detecting and noticing.'' Relating it to the criteria for selection of the dominant cognitive function: (1) task is to actively seek the concerned file; therefore, ''Detecting and noticing'' will be active for more time; (2) noticing the cue or the information of the file while going through a list of files is more challenging than deciding the file based on reading the ID; and (3) failure in ''Detecting and noticing'' may result in the wrong treatment file being used which is the negative outcome of interest for the analysis.
In other cases, more than one function was deemed as dominant: consider, for example, Task 7 of Table 1 , related to deciding the plan mode, beam directions, fields, and so on for the tumor. This task requires understanding of the tumor, its location, and so on and then deciding the type of plan, number of fields, and so on to develop the plan. Thus, both, ''Sense-making and understanding'' and ''Decision making'' are active in this task. Indeed, depending on the tumor type and location, one of the two functions may take prominence. For example, on one hand, in case of simple tumor locations, the personnel would most likely directly decide the treatment plan, without much need for ''Sense-making and understanding.'' On the other hand, for complex tumor locations possibly close to healthy vital organs, the decision would be preceded by significant activity of ''Sense-making and understanding.'' The complete list of Example Tasks identified and associated macrocognitive functions is presented in Appendix 2.
Step 3: determining influencing factor set for each Example Task
In this step, each Example Task is mapped to the corresponding set of PIFs, to prepare for grouping the Example Tasks into the GTTs (step 4). The PIF hierarchy used in this step to present the results is shown in Table 2 and is based on Groth and Mosleh. As an example, Figure 8 shows this process for the Example Task ''Check of transferred data to a software/machine.'' Four failure modes have been identified: the decision is made not to perform the quality check (involving the ''Decision making'' cognitive function); the check is not performed, involuntarily (e.g. it is forgotten, a slip following a procedure, involving the ''Action'' cognitive function); the check is performed, but the deviation from the requirement is not noticed or recognized (''Detecting and noticing''); or slips occur during the check, for example, a checklist is not correctly gone through, involving the ''Action'' cognitive function.
Then, each failure mode is further specified by the expected failure causes, mechanisms, and affecting PIFs. For example, for failure mode, ''deviation from the requirement is not recognized,'' the failure cause ''Misperception of information'' is identified as relevant. As for the failure mechanisms, the following are deemed as relevant: poor ''cue/information content,'' ''distraction (vigilance-attention),'' and ''low vigilance due to expectation'' (i.e. expectation that the information to be checked is correct). The affecting PIFs were identified as ''Training-Experience, Resources, HMI, Personal, Loads, and Environment.'' Note that by doing so, the PIFs influencing each failure mechanism are incorporated in the final method itself. For example, from Figure 8 , the failure mechanism ''cue content'' points to failures caused by how the information is presented: the factors that were identified as relevant for this failure mechanism are ''Resources'' and ''HMI.'' These will be incorporated in the decision trees developed for each failure mode (refer to section ''Main elements of the HRA method under development''). Indeed, in the end, many PIFs (possibly all) affect the overall task, depending on the context; this is visible from Figure 8 where all PIFs affect the Example Task if one considers all failure mechanisms. The specific influences of the context are represented in the PIF evaluations, which determine the applicable failure probability through the developed decision trees (Figure 1) .
Generally, as discussed in sub-section ''The underlying cognitive framework,'' the taxonomies provided by Whaley et al. 17 were found to be directly applicable to the radiotherapy domain: at their definition level, the sets of cognitive functions, proximate causes, failure mechanisms, and PIFs are of generic nature. Indeed, domain-specific aspects characterize each element (see sub-section ''The underlying cognitive framework''). Also, the developed structures linking macrocognitive function failures to PIFs reflect specific influences. Some examples regarding the different characterization of the macrocognitive functions were already presented in sub-section ''The underlying cognitive framework.'' Here, other examples of differences compared to Whaley et al. 17 are presented: in the developed structures and in the characterization of the PIFs. Consider again the case presented in Figure 8 concerning a check of transferred data. The proximate cause ''cue/information misperceived'' addresses the fact that the quality check does not recognize the presence of a deviation from the requirement (e.g. the dose in the patient chart is not the same as in the control document (i.e. prescribed by the doctor)). The structure presented in Whaley et al. 17 identifies five cognitive failure mechanisms affecting this proximate cause:
Failure of attention-missing a change in cues; Failure due to cue content-cues too complex (''cue content'' in Figure 8) ; Failure of vigilance in monitoring-divided attention (''vigilance-attention'' in Figure 8) ; Failure due to expectation-mismatch between expected and actual cues (''expectation'' in Figure 8) ; Failure of working memory-working memory capacity overflow.
As shown in Figure 8 , two of the above mechanisms were not considered to be applicable for the specific task: failure of attention-missing a change in cues and failure of working memory-working memory capacity overflow. Concerning the former, attention to changes in the cues over the course of an event is indeed an important cognitive activity in control room settings to deal with the evolution of an accident. This was not deemed relevant for the specific application because the information subject of the quality check does not evolve during the check itself. The latter also refers to a situation relevant to control room setting in which the operating crew may need to deal with large amounts of information (alarms, indications, and plant parameter trends) accumulating over time and possibly imposing on the capacity of the operator working memory. Again, this situation was not deemed to be relevant for the present application: during the check, generally, the personnel do not have to mentally process large amount of information so as to possibly reach the working memory capacity.
As said above, in some cases, the specific influences relevant for the PIFs had to be adapted from Whaley et al. 17 An important example is the case of PIF ''Environment.'' For the proximate cause ''cues/information misperceived'' (for instance, relevant to characterize the failure of cognitive function ''Detecting and noticing'' from the example in Figure 8 ), Whaley et al. 17 emphasize the possible effect of background noise on verbal communication, accounting for how humans recognize the words in environments and, for example, how background noise can possibly affect information perception. However, when considering the radiotherapy domain, the specific influence of PIF ''Environment'' in the form of distractions and interruptions was observed as important negative performance contributor in past event analyses and databases. 24, 25, 32, 37 Indeed, their relevance for patient safety has been recognized for the overall health-care sector; 67 recently, Williams and Bell 68 have added these as a new EPC to the HEART method. To highlight this difference in the specific influence, PIF ''Environment'' is marked with symbol ''s'' in the structure shown in Figure 8 . The above discussion is intended to give an idea of the adaptations required to apply Whaley et al.'s cognitive framework to the specific domain. A systematic comparison of the PIFs in the two domains is considered outside the scope of this article. Definitions of the PIFs will be developed in combination with the development of the decision trees supporting quantification (see section ''Main elements of the HRA method under development''). Finally, for each Example Task, the final set of PIFs is collected from all its failure modes and mechanisms.
Step 4: formation of GTTs The last step is to form the GTTs from the set of Example Tasks. As an example, Table 3 shows an initial grouping of all the Example Tasks that relate to identification: of resources, patients, and so on; then, when the involved cognitive functions and set of influencing factors were considered, some Example Tasks of Table  3 were moved to a different GTT group (to ''simple interaction with software or tools''). In particular, these tasks included ''identification of patient using electronic devices,'' such as ''barcode, or using magnetic strip, or embedded chips.'' Indeed, because of the support from these devices, these tasks were judged to be better characterized by the cognitive function ''Action'' (A), as opposed to ''Detecting and noticing'' (D/N) which characterizes the rest of the Example Tasks of Table 3 . The final list of Example Tasks characterizing the GTT ''Identification of patient or patient-related items'' is shown in Table 4 . Note that all Example Tasks in the group (Table 4) involve matching a value/code/image to identify whether a person, an object, or a value is the correct one. The way in which the initial approach to the person, object, or value may be different, as exemplified by the first part of the Example Task description (with verbs such as call, ask, and look), but for all tasks, the key cognitive activity is related to the matching (therefore involving the ''Detecting and noticing'' cognitive function).
Based on the Example Tasks and the general expected features of the overall GTT, its definition is then intuitively developed as identification of either the patient to be treated or the patient-specific items (like tools, moulages, files, charts etc.) required for the radiotherapy treatment process. The identification task is done by comparing the specified item like ID number, patient's face or any other unique feature of the patient (e.g. birthmark, patient full name etc.) with the number, photograph or the feature on the control document. The identification of patient takes place as many times in the process as the patient comes to the institution; starting from the first time patient comes for Planning Computed Tomography scan till the delivery of the last fraction. The identification of patient's items occurs throughout the process whenever they are required.
As another example, Example Tasks that relate to input or transfer of data and so on were grouped into ''Simple interaction with software or tool'' GTT, see Table 5 . The dominant cognitive function for this type of GTT is ''Action,'' see Appendix 3. No refinement was required for this GTT, as the grouping was straightforward and the Example Tasks fully met the criteria of task description, similar cognitive function, and similar PIF profiles affecting the tasks. For the definition of the GTT, see Appendix 4. 
Generic task types
Example Task
Identification of patient or patient-related items
Calling name out loud (in front of a group) and matching with some ID Ask for the name to the patient and match with the ID card Checking the patient-specific parameters like patient identification number, weight, birthmarks, and so on Look at the photograph and match Identification of file or tool from a list by looking at the ID Identification of file or tool by remembering the ID (memory based) Identification of file or tool while person is reading out the ID Identification of the patient using barcodes Identification of the patient using chips in the wrist of the patient Personalized magnetic strip card-based identification Table 4 . Final grouping of the Example Tasks into the GTT identification of patient or patient-related items.
Generic task types Example Task Macrocognitive function
Identification of patient or patient-related items
Calling name out loud (in front of a group) and matching with some ID Detecting and noticing Ask for the name to the patient and match with the ID card Detecting and noticing Checking the patient-specific parameters like patient identification number, weight, birthmarks, and so on Detecting and noticing
Look at the photograph and match
Detecting and noticing Identification of file or tool from a list by looking at the ID Detecting and noticing Identification of file or tool by remembering the ID (memory based)
Detecting and noticing Identification of file or tool while person is reading out the ID Detecting and noticing Table 5 . GTTs with their Example Tasks and macrocognitive functions. The other Example Tasks were grouped following a similar process, obtaining the set of six GTTs and corresponding Example Tasks presented in Table 5 . The final GTT-PIF structure with failure causes, mechanisms, and PIFs is presented in Appendix 3. For the detailed definitions of GTTs with descriptions, refer to Appendix 4. Subgroups within each GTT were formed for convenience of the presentation and are shown in Table 5 .
Generic task types
Concerning the GTT ''Quality check,'' the subgrouping is intended to distinguish between short and detailed check, which is aimed to capture difference in the depth and the scope of checking tasks and thus the effectiveness of the checks. The additional cognitive function in a ''detailed check'' case is ''Sense-making and understanding and Team coordination,'' and the PIFs included in this would model the variation (Table 5 ). The aspect of dependency between checkers, as analyzed, for example, in THERP, will be considered and modeled at the quantification stage of the method. 51 Indeed, the list of Example Tasks in Table 5 is not exhaustive. For example, in GTT ''Identification of patient or patient-related items,'' a different Example Task could be the combination of the first and fourth Example Tasks, that is, ''calling the name out loud and matching photograph.'' Furthermore, for GTT ''Complex interaction with software or tool,'' a different Example Task could be formed as ''Positioning the patient with photos while adjusting the patient.'' Indeed, Table 5 is not meant to cover all possible variants of personnel interactions, but reference tasks to better define each GTT.
Validation of the GTT-PIF structure against Huq et al.
This section presents an attempt to validate, at least partially, the developed GTT-PIF framework. The validation considers recent work by the AAPM to provide guidance on the application of a combination of FMEA-fault tree analysis (FTA) techniques to radiotherapy, in support of quality management programs for specific clinics. 38 Field experts belonging to various clinics developed a generic FMEA and FTA for ''Intensity modulated radiation therapy.'' The concept for validation has been to map the process tasks, failure modes, and potential causes identified in Huq et al. 38 to the GTT-PIF structure developed in the present work: a correspondence would indicate that the GTT-PIF structure addresses tasks and influencing factors relevant for the specific application. It is important to mention that the FMEA from Huq et al. 38 was not used to develop the GTT-PIF structure: in this sense, it represents new information to assess the coverage of the GTT-PIF structure.
As an example, the mapping of one process task failure mode from Huq et al. 38 is presented in detail in Table 6 . Task number 31 of Huq et al. 38 addresses imaging of the clinical target volume: this volume covers the visible tumor volume plus the possible extent of microscopic tumor spread, that is, the primary tumor and its surrounding tissues. According to the FMEA (see Table 6 ), one associated failure mode is the incorrect interpretation of this treatment volume; the potential causes identified by Huq et al. 38 are inadequate training and lack of communication (the latter intended as missing necessary information as opposed to failures in verbal communication). When mapping this task to the developed GTT-PIFs structure, the GTT chosen for the task is ''Complex interaction with software or tool,'' as the task involves understanding of the tumor and of its surrounding volume before the image can be taken, interacting with the software in use (Example Task ''Looking and capturing data'' represents well this task, see Table 5 ). As shown in Table 6 , the failure mode ''misinterpretation of data'' was found to correspond to the one identified in the FMEA (incorrect interpretation of tumor or tissue for images). In this context, the ''data'' are the tumor and the surrounding tissues, such that the clinical target volume can be identified and captured in the imaging.
The factors identified in Huq et al., 38 inadequate training and lack of communication, are both covered in the developed GTT-PIF structure, by factors ''Training/Experience'' and ''Resources (necessary information),'' respectively. As shown in Table 6 , ''Training/ Experience'' influences the two cognition-related failure causes associated to the failure of the ''Sense-making and understanding'' cognitive function: ''Incorrect frame'' and ''Incorrect integration of data and frames.'' One should note that, the model adopted in Whaley et al. to represent ''Sense-making and understanding'' is Klein's data-frame theory. 17, 69 Data is the information coming into the sense-making process; the data is integrated with an existing frame, which is a mental representation that serves as a structure for explaining the data and guiding the search for more data. 69 ''A frame encompasses the concepts of a mental representation, a mental model, a story, a map, a schema, a script, or a plan, and serves as a structure for explaining the data and guiding the search for more data''. 17 Accordingly, three primary sources of failure are identified for this cognitive function: the data (e.g., wrong information is used), the frame (e.g., an incorrect model to understand the situation is used), or the integration of the two (e.g., new information is not properly integrated with the frame). 17 ''Incorrect frame'' and ''Incorrect integration of data and frames.'' In this case, for example, considered in Table 6 , incorrect frame may represent the lack of knowledge that a specific type or location of tumor would possibly spread in certain body locations or that delivering dose in a specific location may involve the presence of organs at risk. As another example, ''incorrect integration of data and frames'' may represent that although the therapist has the above-mentioned knowledge, he or she fails to match the case under analysis to those specific tumor type and location. Similarly, ''necessary information'' in the ''Resources'' PIF influences the data-related failure cause associated with the failure of ''Sense-making and understanding'' cognitive function: ''Incorrect data.'' In this case, for example, if the necessary information like patient-specific tumor location, its size, spread, and other clinical details is not provided to the personnel performing the imaging, then the lack of necessary information (''incorrect data'' as mentioned in Whaley et al. 17 ) may lead to incomplete or incorrect understanding of the situation and thus incomplete or incorrect imaging of the required clinical target volume.
The FMEA cases involving human failures with the highest severity and highest risk priority number (RPN) were selected for validation of the GTT-PIF structure. Overall, about 20 cases were selected; Table 7 shows the summary of the matching for the top 10 RPN cases (full table in Appendix 5). As shown by the analysis of case 31 above, a failure mode is influenced by PIFs via different pathways over the GTT-PIF structure (e.g. in Table 6 ''Training/Experience'' influences the failure mode ''misinterpretation of data'' through the two failure mechanisms ''Incorrect frame'' and ''Incorrect integration of data and frames''). For brevity, for each pair of failure mode and potential cause in the FMEA, Table 7 shows only one of the possible pathways through the failure mechanisms. Overall, it can be seen from Table 6 that in practice, all the potential causes from Huq et al. 38 were mapped to the produced GTT-PIF structures at the PIF level. The recurrent potential causes such as ''Inadequate training,'' ''lack of standardized procedures,'' ''inadequate design specification,'' ''lack of staff,'' and ''Lack of communication (intended as missing necessary information)'' can be easily mapped to PIFs ''Training/Experience,'' ''Resources (necessary information),'' ''Human-machine interface,'' ''Loads (workload, time pressure),'' and ''Resources (necessary information),'' respectively.
For some cases, potential causes were not matched to PIFs but to failure mechanisms or to other GTTs. For example, potential cause ''inattention'' from Huq et al. 38 (case 58) is rather a failure mechanism in the GTT-PIF structure (Appendix 5) as opposed to a PIF. Indeed, for the purposes of an HRA, inattention is regarded as the result of other underlying causing factors, such as Loads and Environment, as exemplified in Appendix 5. Other potential causes from Huq et al. 38 instead relate to failures in other task, for example, ''failure to review work,'' ''tool used incorrectly,'' or ''incorrect procedure used'' (e.g. cases 59 and 137). In the GTT-PIF structure, these would correspond to failures in other task types: indeed, the fact that these could be matched to other GTTs gives further assurance of the comprehensive coverage of the proposed structure. For example, in case 59, ''tools incorrectly used'' will be assigned to ''Simple interaction with software or tools'' GTT, and in case 126, ''incorrect final prescription'' will be assigned to ''iterative evaluation of optimum parameters'' GTT. for many failure cases is ''Failure to review work'': in the presented GTT-PIF structure, this corresponds to a GTT failure rather than an influencing factor (specifically, it would be covered in the ''Quality check'' GTT). This failure cause is not reported in this table for brevity.
b
The adopted PIF hierarchy is presented in Table 2 .
c ''A frame encompasses the concepts of a mental representation, a mental model, a story, a map, a schema, a script, or a plan, and serves as a structure for explaining the data and guiding the search for more data.'' See text in section ''Validation of the GTT-PIF structure against Huq et al.'' for an example interpretation of frame in this context. 17 Table 7 . Summary of validation of the GTT-PIF structure against FMEA for radiotherapy.
38
FMEA from Huq et al. for many failure cases is ''Failure to review work'': in the presented GTT-PIF structure, this corresponds to a GTT failure rather than an influencing factor (specifically, it would be covered in the ''Quality check'' GTT). This failure cause is not reported in this table for brevity. is ''inattention''; this has been mapped to the ''vigilance'' failure mechanism, see Appendix 5 (not reported here for brevity, as it applies to all cases).
c The adopted PIF hierarchy is presented in Table 2 . This has been mapped to failure mechanism ''mental manipulation of the information is inadequate, inaccurate or otherwise inappropriate.''.
e These causes as presented by Huq et al.
correspond to GTT failures in the proposed GTT-PIF structure, rather than PIFs, as described in the text.
The above-discussed mismatches in mapping failure causes originate from differences in the aims of the FMEA and GTT-PIF structure. The ''potential cause'' entry of the FMEA is intended to identify any negative condition potentially causing the failure, independently on whether this reflects the result of another failure, the way in which the failure occurs, or the underlying factor influencing the performance; the important element for the FMEA is that the ''potential cause'' identifies some direct improvement in the process to decrease the chances for occurrence of the failure. The proposed GTT-PIF structure instead aims at a comprehensive and structured identification of the failure causes and influencing factors. In this aim, it is instead important to distinguish the different levels at which failure modes, mechanisms, and factors operate. Indeed, for the purposes of the present validation, it was deemed as important that the failure causes from Huq et al. 38 are actually covered by the GTT-PIF structure, regardless of the level at which this occurs.
Conclusion
This article has presented a methodology to develop a GTT-PIF structure, as the causal mapping foundation for a new HRA method based on the GTT and PIF notions. The structure is directly linked to a cognitive model of literature to ensure that the relevant failure modes and influencing factors are covered.
The proposed methodology emphasizes the traceability of the process underlying the formation of the structure. The process is traceable, that is, it is possible to follow how tasks are identified, transformed, and finally included in the GTT definitions. The tasks are sequentially processed, from the initial HTAs and incident analyses, as specific tasks, Example Tasks, and finally GTTs, through different levels of abstraction. All steps of the process can indeed be easily followed. The inclusion of the Example Tasks in the GTT definition (1) is intended to make GTT descriptions transparent: it shows which tasks are in the scope of each GTT; (2) helps in assessing the orthogonality for the GTTs when defining them; Example Tasks can be compared, and overlapping components can be modified; and (3) is expected to improve the usability of the GTT taxonomy: an analyst would clearly know what tasks belong to a specific GTT and thus would reduce the practitioner's effort.
The properties of traceability and transparency were sought to facilitate the review of the process by external people, not involved in the GTT formation in the first place. This is expected to foster the consensus and acceptability of the HRA method under development, as a whole. Traceability and transparency facilitate the incorporation of new tasks (or new ways to carry out tasks) into the GTT definitions. This may become necessary to reflect modifications in the work processes in a specific facility or application of the HRA method to a different facility.
The methodology has been applied to radiotherapy domain allowing formation of definitions of sectorspecific representative critical tasks and development of GTT-PIF structure which provide structured framework for assessing what may influence the personnel performance of a particular task. A total of six GTTs were formed, and based on the number of identified failure modes, a total of 18 GTT-PIF structures were developed using the framework from Whaley et al., 17 which included 13 ''proximate causes'' and more than 15 ''failure mechanisms.'' Conditions like ''Interruptions'' and ''distractions'' were included in the GTT-PIF structures to capture the domain-specific characteristics.
The GTT-PIF structure was validated against a consensus FMEA developed by the AAPM by field experts belonging to various clinics. 38 The concept for validation has been to map the process tasks, failure modes, and potential causes identified in Huq et al. 38 to the GTT-PIF structure developed in the present work. The correspondence indicates that the GTT-PIF structure addresses tasks and influencing factors relevant for the specific application. It is important to mention that the FMEA was not used to develop the GTT-PIF structure: in this sense, it represents new information to assess the coverage of the GTT-PIF structure.
The next step is to develop the quantification model for the HRA method under development for radiotherapy. The aim is to use the GTT-PIF structures as the base for quantification, nominal human error probabilities (HEPs) at the failure mode level of the GTTs, and then systematically incorporate the effect of applicable PIFs (from the GTT-PIF structures). The primary sources to quantify the HEPs will be from existing HRA methods (e.g. THERP, CARA, and NARA), cross-sector human failure incident database, and incident database of PSI's CPT. Indeed, the applicability of the data from the first two sources will have to be studied and is currently underway. The unquantifiable HEPs from the primary source of data will be elicited by experts. The design of expert elicitation exercise is also currently ongoing. Finally, the method once developed will be applied to PSI's CPT to study potential failure scenarios.
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Accuracy checks for positioning 8 Selecting region for CT scan (including lead marks) 9
Inserting markers on the CT scan (orientation) 10 Taking photos in treatment position 11
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